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Introduction
Marriage is a union between spouses who are given by law specific rights and duties resulting from that relationship. The divorce revolution 1 from the 1960s onwards has changed the enforcement of these agreements between the spouses. Brinig and Crafton (1994, p. 872) hypothesize that as a result of easier divorce there are "fewer marriages ex ante, fewer children (born later, after a longer trial period), more investment in individual careers rather than in the marriage, more divorces, and, ex post, more breaches by spouses in positions to behave opportunistically." Opportunistic behavior by spouses effectively undermines "the trust-enhancing function of marriage as an institution" (Rowthorn, 1999, p. 682) and thereby "corrodes the social fabric of trust" (ibid.). This paper provides an empirical examination of whether the easy divorce culture has affected trust by examining the effect of the law changes that epitomize the divorce revolution on generalized trust. The findings indicate that the divorce revolution has indeed influenced the level of generalized trust in the American society.
The traditional legal marriage divided the rights and responsibilities of husbands and wives on the basis of gender where the "woman was to devote herself to being a wife, homemaker, and mother in return for her husband's promise of lifelong support" (Weitzman, 1985, p. 2) . Traditional legal marriage assumed that "the spouses are engaged in a joint enterprise, were responsible for each other, and would share the fruits of their united endeavors" (Weitzman, 1985, pp. 4-5) . Marital contract lowers the transaction costs of enforcing agreements in marriage and allows the partners to invest in the relationship with a lower risk of the partner reneging on agreements (such as sexual fidelity and raising children)
that have been made (Pollak, 1985) . Indeed Cherlin (2004) suggests that the difference 2 between marriage and a de facto relationship is that the major benefit of marriage is the socalled enforceable trust. As a result of a marital contract the spouses can have more confidence that their investments in the marriage will be recouped. Some of potential investments in marriage include the division of household responsibilities (paid work versus household work), a large up-front investment in a house and other instances of increasing returns to scale.
Traditionally the aim of divorce laws was to "preserve marriage as a lifelong union
[with divorce] restricted to situations in which one party committed a serious marital offense such as adultery, cruelty, or desertion, giving the other party the legal basis or ground for the divorce" (Weitzman, 1985, p.7) . The earliest divorce laws defined fault-based grounds for divorce which effectively identified an "innocent" and a "guilty" party to the divorce with divorce being granted to the "innocent" party. Requiring grounds for divorce gave the "innocent" party a great deal of power over the "guilty" party as the spouse who wanted a divorce had to persuade the "innocent" partner to cooperate. The divorce revolution changed the terms of the contract to favor the "guilty" party that is the spouse who wishes to break their marital vows (Becker, 1981; Becker et al., 1977) .
The major law changes contained in the divorce revolution compared to the traditional divorce law include not needing to prove fault or guilt to obtain a divorce. Furthermore, financial awards were no longer linked to fault but instead they were based on current financial needs and resources. The divorce revolution also changed the standards for alimony and property awards seeking to treat men and women more equally compared to the genderbased assumptions of the traditional law. The no-fault divorce revolution effectively changed the terms of the moral and legal contract between spouses to abolish any "compensation"
(such as a monetary payment or a public humiliation) for violating the terms of the contract.
Effectively, under the new legislation there no longer were any penalties for adultery and no rewards for fidelity.
The changes in the divorce laws have undermined the value of marriage as an institution and hence it can reasonably be expected that marriage rates would have decreased as a result. In fact Rasul (2003) finds that following the introduction of unilateral divorce laws, marriage rates declined significantly and permanently in the adopting US states. He finds that the decline in the marriage rate caused by unilateral divorce law accounts for 3.6%
of the overall decline in the marriage rate. In a subsequent theoretical paper, he further distinguishes the following effects of divorce laws on marriage: 1) a direct pipeline effect on the stock of married couples at the time of the law change and 2) a selection effect whereas the couples that decide to marry might become better matched than those previously married under the mutual consent divorce laws (Rasul, 2006) . If one then considers a move from mutual consent to no-fault divorce laws, the effect on the long run divorce rate is ambiguous as the selection effect may offset the pipeline effect.
Empirical evidence of the effect of the move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce laws indicates that, although there are strong short-term effects (Friedberg, 1998 2 ; Peters, 1986 Peters, , 1992 Allen, 1992) , divorce laws do not affect the divorce rate in the long run (Wolfers, 2006; Gonzalez and Viitanen, 2009 ). These empirical findings could well be explained by the selection versus pipeline effect with fewer people entering a formal marital contract and instead opting for the increasingly common de facto relationship.
Given that social capital including trust is found to have a significant payoff (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Berggren, 2006; Bjornskov 2006, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011) , it is of interest to examine whether the country's legal framework has 2 Friedberg (1998) found significant permanent effects of unilateral divorce law on divorce rates, however, the result was revised by Wolfers (2006) who found merely a transitory effect on the divorce rate.
4 undermined the institution of marriage, in terms of trust. It has been found that parental divorce is associated with lower levels of trust in parents and future intimate partners (Franklin et al., 1990; King, 2002) as well as on own levels of generalized trust (Viitanen, 2014) . Rawthorn (1999) argues that "many of the legal and social reforms which have been implemented in modern times have undermined the ability of marriage to perform its basic role as a trust-creating institution" (p.662). This summarizes the role of this paper in examining a potential association between divorce laws and trust.
Method

Data
The analysis of the effect of exposure to a culture of easier divorce on trust is conducted using the General Social Survey (GSS) Sensitive Data Files from 1973-2010 for the US (Smith et al., 2011) . The GSS is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of approximately 1,500 randomly selected individuals every year from 1973 through 1993 (excluding 1974, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1992) who are currently residing in the same state as when they were a minor. This reduces the sample to 22,590 individual observations of which 12,622 are women and 9,968 are men.
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The GSS has been widely used to study trust as it consistently asked the following question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Possible answers are "most people can be trusted", "you can't be too careful" or "it depends". I aggregate the last two categories ("you can't be too careful" or "it depends") to take the value of 0 and define trust as a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the individual is trusting.
Glaeser et al. (2000) were the first to criticize the use of survey trust questions as they 6
Analytic strategy
The following Ordinary Least Squares linear probability model 3 is fitted to the GSS statelevel panel data to assess the impact of an easier divorce culture as a minor 4 on generalized trust at the individual level:
where subscript i denotes the individual, s denotes the state and t indicates the year. The dichotomous trust measure is estimated to be a function of exposure to divorce as a minor (EXPOSED) as well as state and year fixed effects and state trends (Model 1). Model 2 includes the following individual level characteristics: age, age squared, years of education, marital status and employment status. Table 1 One may be worried that the timing of divorce legislation could be endogenous, driven by changes in social norms in a given state. I address this concern by controlling for smooth trends at the state level, and estimating the effect of the law changes only off of discontinuous "jumps" at the date of the reforms. To the extent that changes in social norms or political climate are continuous over time, the estimated effects can plausibly be attributed to the changes in divorce laws.
Additionally, I run regressions where exposure is measured using three separate dummies in order to account for the length of exposure (1 to 4 years, 5 to 8 years, and more than 8 years). Note that it is not possible to separate the effect of years of exposure from the effect 7 of age at exposure, since they are perfectly correlated. A child exposed to divorce for 10 years will necessarily be exposed since age 7. Table 2 describes the sample means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The sample includes individual observations from the GSS for which there are no missing values for age, trust, marital status, work status or education. This leaves a sample of 22,590 observations. On average 40.8% of men and 36.1% of women in the sample report trusting most people. Over half of the individuals in the sample are married and nearly 39% of women and 64% of men work full-time.
Descriptive statistics
The level of trust has decreased across the US since the early 70s 5 as shown in Table   3 . Table 4 summarizes data availability by state and shows that some of the variability in trust across the decades could be due to small sample sizes for a handful of states such as Alaska, New Mexico or Maine.
Exposure to divorce is based on the divorce reform classification obtained from the source bill as reported in Gold (2010) and partially reproduced in (2006) . Table 5 also reports the interpretation of the date when the bill became effective as used in the aforementioned studies. The interpretation of date effective of the law reform is the same across the studies only in 8 states hence the analysis section includes robustness checks to the alternative definitions (Table 6 ).
Empirical results
The effect of the years of exposure to no-fault divorce on generalized trust is reported in Table 6 using a difference-in-differences model. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the individual reports being trusting. The main independent variable of interest is the number of years exposed to easy divorce culture as a minor. All of the models include year and state dummies as well as state trends. The results tables report the coefficient estimates from a linear probability model of the main independent variable only.
Model 1 shows a highly significant correlation between years of exposure to easy divorce culture on trust for both men and women. Model 2 results including individual level controls (age, age squared, years of education, marital status and employment status 6 ) show that there is no statistically significant effect of the years of exposure to easy divorce culture for men.
However, for women another year of exposure to easy divorce culture as a minor reduces 9 generalized trust by 0.4 percentage points (Table 6 , Model 2). The following models only report the results with individual controls included in the model. These overall finding is in agreement with the prediction of Rowthorn (1999) regarding the no-fault divorce reforms reducing the security offered by marriage, in particular for women. Weitzman (1985) further argues that the consequences of the divorce revolution have fallen most heavily on the older women who were brought up in the culture of fault based divorces only with stronger marital contracts. The generational differences are tested by running separate regressions for pre-baby boomers (born in 1945 or earlier) and baby boomers (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) in Table 8 and the X generation (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) 7 and the individuals born in the 1970s (when most of the divorce law reforms took place) in Table 9 .
Men born in 1945 or before (the pre-baby boomers) have interesting positive and statistically significant results (Table 8) . Specifically an additional year of exposure to easy divorce culture as a minor (that is prior to 1963 at the latest) increases their trust by 0.7 percentage points and an exposure of 9+ years shows an increase in trust of 13.1 percentage points. A possible explanation for this result is that this is the generation that instigated the law reforms that resulted in the divorce revolution. Weitzman (1985, p. 17 ) quoted a subgroup of men who believed that "the [fault based] divorce law and its practitioners were in league with divorced wives to suck the blood, not to mention the money, of former 10 husbands" urging divorce laws to be revised to treat men and women equally. The same explanation could be used to comprehend the negative association for women between years of exposure and their generalized trust with an extra year leading to a 0.3 percentage point lower level of trust.
There are no significant results for the women of the Baby Boomer generation, however, for men an additional year of exposure to an easy divorce culture is associated with a 0.9 percentage point lower trust and an exposure of 9+ years is associated with a 9.7
percentage lower report of being trusting (Table 8 ). The Baby Boomer generation was the first generation that as young to middle aged adults could benefit from access to easy no-fault divorce. Further, the gender difference may be due to approximately two-thirds of all divorces being filed by women (Brinig and Allen, 2000). The Baby Boomer generation individuals are the ones who were brought up and sometimes even got married during the fault-based era and hence experienced the "change in the marital contract" first hand.
On the other hand, the X generation would have mostly been brought up within the no-fault culture and while potentially experiencing parental divorce they would have had a chance to adapt to the new culture before themselves getting married. The X generation (and a subgroup of 1970s individuals) results in Table 9 show positive effects for men and some negative effects for women. For women 1-4 years of exposure is associated with 8.9 (14.8) and hence may be more trusting on average. To paraphrase Rowthorn (1999) , to get married is no longer such a major commitment due to easier divorce that allows individuals to exit unhappy relationships at minimum cost and delay.
Rasul (2006) points out that unilateral divorce law may have affected selection into marriage hence the data is further explored by marital status. Table 10 includes results for married women. The results for widowed or never married are never significantly different from zero and neither are the results for men. Married women report 0.5 percentage points lower trust level per year of exposure to easy divorce culture. The magnitude of the effect is the same for divorced/separated women, however, this result is only significant at 10% level.
For the married sub-sample, exposure of 5 to 8 years is associated with a 7 percentage point lower trust in easy divorce culture compared to a fault based divorce legislation states.
Exposure of 9 or more years is associated with 4.7 percentage point lower trust level although this is only significant at 10% level.
The result for married women is as expected based on Rowthorn's (1999) argument on how marriage "no longer offers the degree of security which it once did" (p.663). With marriage providing less (financial) security it is rational for women who have been brought up within the easy divorce culture to concentrate on their own employment and earnings prospects. Indeed, Brinig and Crafton (1994) argued that the easy divorce culture is associated with more concentration on individual careers. Since the 1970s both female labor force participation rates as well as higher education graduation rates have increased dramatically (Goldin, 2006) ; whether this apparent relationship between divorce laws and the changes in female labor market outcomes is indeed causal and direct is unclear but would deserve further analysis.
Conclusions
This paper develops an empirical analysis of exposure to a culture of easier divorce (defined as no-fault including unilateral) as a minor on generalized trust. It contributes to the family law as well as empirical literature in sociology and economics by providing evidence of the effect of the "no-fault divorce revolution" on the individuals within society. The evidence confirms the predictions of Rowthorn (1999) who argued that "the fault-based system increases the degree of trust between individuals, thereby encouraging them to invest in their marriages" (p.686) whereas the move to no-fault divorce has reduced the security offered by marriage and a reduction in interpersonal trust.
The empirical analysis uses General Social Survey data for the US from 1973-2010.
The effect of the law changes on trust is analyzed within a difference-in-differences framework controlling for individual confounding factors including age, marital status, employment status and the level of education as well as state and year specific events as well as state trends.
According to the results, the easier divorce culture has had some effect on trust levels across the US. While there are no discernible effects for the whole sample of men, there are statistically significant effects for women with an additional year of exposure being associated with a 4 percentage point lower generalized trust in the states with easy divorce culture compared to states with fault based divorce culture. Generational effects indicate that men born before the baby Boomer generation are 13 percentage points more trusting in general in the no-fault states compared to the fault states whereas Baby Boomer men are 9.7 percentage points less trusting if they are exposed to 9 or more years of the easy divorce culture. The X generation men show strong positive effects of the easy divorce culture on trust while the X generation women show negative effects.
An analysis by sub-group of women indicates that married women have significantly lower levels of trust associated with exposure to easy divorce culture as a child. The overall findings are in agreement with the predictions of previous literature regarding no-fault divorce reforms 13 reducing the security offered by marriage, in particular for women. Whether divorce law reforms have had a direct causal effect on the changes in female educational attainment and labor supply behavior of the past half a century deserves further study. Table 1 : Variable definitions Definition Trust 1 for answers "you can't be too careful" or "it depends" to question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?", 0 otherwise. Exposure Number of years exposed to no-fault legislation within state as a minor ranging between 0 and 17. Exposure 1-4 years Number of years exposed to no-fault legislation within state as a minor: 1-4. Exposure 5-8 years Number of years exposed to no-fault legislation within state as a minor: 5-8. Exposure 9+ years Number of years exposed to no-fault legislation within state as a minor: 9 or more. Age Age of respondent Education Number of years of schooling completed. 
